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Same-Sex Marriage, Federalism, 
and Judicial Supremacy 
Robert F. Nagel † 
Abstract 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in United States v. Windsor is 
characterized by a number of strained and wavering constitutional 
claims.  Prominent among these is the argument that the principle of 
federalism calls into question the congressional decision to adopt the 
traditional definition of marriage, which the state of New York 
rejected.  An examination of earlier federalism cases demonstrates 
that Kennedy’s appreciation for federalism is in fact severely limited 
and suggests and that his lax use of legal authority is directly—if 
perversely—related to this limited appreciation.  
Federalism cases prior to Windsor show that Justice Kennedy 
supports state authority only when it presents no serious challenge to 
national authority.  Indeed, the cases indicate that he is deeply fearful 
that a robust system of federalism would be dangerous to nationhood.  
Furthermore, he sees national authority as fragile in part because he 
has long understood the Court’s constitutional decisions, a principal 
symbol of nationhood, as being based only loosely in conventional 
legal authority and, therefore, to be highly contestable.  The Windsor 
opinion’s imprecise argumentation reflects this skepticism about the 
conclusiveness of conventional legal authority.   
Perversely, it is this same skepticism that has led Justice Kennedy 
to support a strong version of judicial supremacy in cases like Casey 
v. Planned Parenthood, where a state contested the Court’s 
interpretative power, and Brown v. Plata, where a state undermined a 
federal court’s remedial authority.  Thus, Windsor cannot realistically 
be viewed as being based on respect for state authority over the issue 
of marriage; rather, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor insists that 
Congress should have deferred to New York’s definition of marriage 
because that definition reinforced, rather than challenged, the Court’s 
earlier pronouncements on gay rights in Romer v. Evans and 
Lawrence v. Texas.  In short, Windsor rests on an exalted view of the 
need for the Supreme Court’s supremacy and at the same time 
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Introduction 
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in United States 
v. Windsor1 is notable for a series of doctrinal feints.2 The opinion 
relies heavily on equal protection precedents, but in the end these are 
used to establish a value (“equal liberty”) ascribed to the Due Process 
Clause. Similarly, the opinion shifts from a deferential standard of 
review to a highly suspicious assessment of legislative motivation. 
Most glaring is Justice Kennedy’s, on-again, off-again reliance on the 
principle of federalism. After an extended discussion suggesting that 
regulation of marriage might be a reserved power of the states, he 
concludes that it is unnecessary to decide this question because state 
authority over marriage is “of central relevance in this case quite 
apart from principles of federalism.”3 The opinion then argues that 
Congress’s “unusual deviation” from accepting a state’s definition of 
marriage is evidence of illicit disapproval of same-sex marriage.4  
It might seem to follow from this emphasis on state authority 
over marriage that Justice Kennedy would be required also to respect 
traditional state definitions of marriage in a case challenging the 
constitutionality of such laws. Perhaps, this is why Chief Justice 
Roberts comments in his dissent that “it is undeniable” that the 
Court’s judgment is “based on federalism.”5 In contrast, Justice Scalia 
argues that Justice Kennedy is locked in, not to deference to state 
judgments about marriage, but to condemnation of state laws limiting 
marriage to heterosexual couples.6 The Roberts position, I would 
guess, will be dismissed by cynics and realists who think that in 
Windsor Kennedy is simply enforcing his own strong views about the 
centrality of the right to sexual freedom and his obvious sympathy for 
homosexuals. Legalists, however, might reply that Kennedy’s 
emphasis on deference to state authority cannot be cavalierly 
 
1. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
2. They are fully described by Justice Scalia. Id. at 2698 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
3. Id. at 2692 (majority opinion). 
4. Id. at 2693. 
5. Id. at 2697 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting).  
6. Id. at 2705–06 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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dismissed in light of his strong record favoring a vigorous role for 
states in our federal system.7  
One point I wish to make in this brief Article is that, despite the 
state sovereignty rhetoric found in many of Justice Kennedy’s 
decisions, he supports only a weak version of the principle of 
federalism. In fact, taken as a whole, Justice Kennedy’s record 
demonstrates a deep fear of political disintegration; therefore, his 
support for federalism is limited to circumstances where the assertion 
of state power does not seriously challenge—or in some way actually 
enhances—the authority of the central government. The notion that 
he would allow a deeply divisive issue like same-sex marriage to be 
decided in a variety of ways in states across the country is 
inconsistent with his deeply held view about the need for 
unchallenged, central authority. A larger point follows from this. 
Those doctrinal feints in Windsor, including Justice Kennedy’s 
confused and ambivalent reliance on federalism, are closely related to 
an aspect of the decision that is perfectly clear: his commitment to 
judicial supremacy. Perversely, the looser the conception of law, the 
more crucial seems that institutional apex of central authority, the 
Supreme Court. 
I. Justice Kennedy Favors State Authority in 
Cases Involving Inconsequential Conflicts with 
National Authority 
In a surprising number of federalism cases, the assertion of state 
authority involves no threat or only a minor threat to national 
authority. Indeed, it is possible for the assertion of state authority to 
enhance aspects of central authority. Consider, for example, 
Hollingsworth v. Perry,8 the case challenging California’s 
constitutional provision prohibiting same sex marriage. Justice 
Kennedy argued that the Court should have deferred to the state law 
judgment that proponents of a state initiative should be authorized to 
defend that initiative in court, a position that would have allowed the 
Supreme Court to resolve the constitutional issues raised by 
traditional state marriage laws.9 To take a different example, when 
the Court, in an opinion authored by Kennedy, invalidated the 
application of a prior version of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act10 to the states, the Court protected state autonomy to impose 
reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulations on religious behavior. In  
7. See cases cited infra notes 8–16 and accompanying text. 
8. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
9. Id. at 2668–69. 
10. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 
1488 invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). 
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doing so, however, it also protected the authoritativeness of its own 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. 
More commonly, protecting state authority does challenge central 
authority—but only marginally. Despite the uproar among 
nationalistic legal scholars caused by the Court’s invalidation of the 
Guns in Schools Act11 and the Violence Against Women Act,12 such 
cases involve challenges to discretionary policies that originate in an 
institution that is itself subject to strong parochial pressures. 
Moreover, these national policies, while frustrated by the defined 
limits of Congress’s delegated powers, can often be achieved by 
resorting to the taxing and spending power, and, in any event, the 
remaining regulatory powers of Congress remain vast in their reach. 
Justice Kennedy’s votes in the cases defining limits to enumerated 
powers, even including his vote to invalidate the Affordable Care 
Act,13 cannot, therefore, be seen as countenancing major or permanent 
loss of the federal government’s power.  
Much the same can be said of Eleventh Amendment cases where a 
congressional policy is found to conflict with state control over the 
immunity of their courts. The national legislative powers involved in 
these cases can be achieved through a range of enforcement 
mechanisms other than state courts, a fact that Justice Kennedy has 
fully explored and emphasized.14 Similarly, Tenth Amendment cases 
that protect state legislative and executive functions from federal 
commandeering15 leave Congress free to achieve its preferred policies  
11. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 551 (1995). 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2006), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000).  
13. The dissenting opinion in National Federal of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius (which Kennedy joined) remains committed to Wickard v. 
Filburn, a decision once widely assumed to authorize virtually unlimited 
scope to Congress’s commerce power. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2648 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is true 
that this dissent denies that the Affordable Care Act is justified under 
the taxing power and also contains an understanding of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause that has some potential for constricting the power of 
the national government. However, it remains within Congress’s power 
to modify the terms of the statute to meet the dissenters’ definition of a 
tax. See id. at 2648–55. Moreover, given the long history of judicial 
deference to Congress’s judgment about the means it chooses to enforce 
its enumerated powers, it is unlikely that the dissenters’ position on the 
meaning of “necessary and proper” will turn out to be an important 
constraint. 
14. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754–57 (1998) (discussing what role a 
state’s sovereign immunity plays in enforcing federal law). 
15. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997); see also New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding that “while 
Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the 
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through generally applicable statutes16 or by the federal government 
itself.  
II. Justice Kennedy Favors National Authority 
in Cases Involving Significant Conflict Between 
State and National Authority 
There is, of course, a set of cases involving more significant 
conflicts between state and federal authority.17 These conflicts are 
more significant because they involve inconsistencies between local 
legislative judgments and constitutional judgments of the Supreme 
Court, judgments that can be viewed as the highest expression of 
 
States to [enact a legislative program consistent with federal interests], 
the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability simply to 
compel the States to do so”).  
16. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 
(1985) (stating that the Court has “not hesitated [to overrule recent 
precedent] when it has become apparent that a prior decision has 
departed from a proper understanding of congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause”).  
17. Less easily categorized are dormant commerce clause cases and 
preemption cases. In the former, congressional authority has not been 
exercised. The conflict, therefore, can be seen as implicating the Court’s 
authority to enforce a value (nondiscriminatory trade) that it finds to 
have constitutional status. To this extent in dormant commerce clause 
cases national authority is in significant conflict with state authority. In 
preemption cases, of course, the claim is that a state statute conflicts with 
a federal statutory scheme. Therefore, preemption cases might be 
analogized to cases where discretionary national legislative policies conflict 
with state legislative policies. Nevertheless, these cases also involve 
national judicial authority because any inconsistency between national 
and local policies is based on a judicial construction of the federal 
statutory scheme and the Court’s judgment about the degree of state 
interference with national purposes. In important instances Justice 
Kennedy votes in both of these types of cases in favor of limiting the 
power of the states. See e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 
530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000) (finding Massachusetts’s prohibition on trade 
with Burma was preempted); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 
2494 (2012) (holding that an Arizona statute criminalizing undocumented 
status and authorizing law enforcement to arrest any suspected 
undocumented aliens was preempted); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. 
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 273–74 (1988) (deciding that “a provision 
that awards a tax credit against the Ohio motor vehicle fuel sales tax for 
each gallon of ethanol sold (as a component of gasohol) by fuel dealers, 
but only if the ethanol is produced in Ohio or in a State that grants 
similar tax advantages to ethanol produced in Ohio” violates the 
Commerce Clause); Carbone v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994) 
(determining that a flow-control ordinance which required all solid waste 
to be processed at a municipal transfer station violated the Commerce 
Clause because it deprived competitors of access to the local market). 
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centralized authority because they involve the supreme law of the 
land as announced by an institution relatively insulated from 
parochial political pressures. In the bulk of these cases, including two 
important gay-rights decisions authored by Justice Kennedy,18 state 
statutes are invalidated as being inconsistent with the Constitution. 
Others involve state institutions resisting federal injunctive decrees 
that are meant to enforce the Court’s constitutional interpretations.19 
Still others involve state institutions directly contesting such 
interpretations by enforcing laws that are designed to prod the Court 
into limiting or reversing an announced constitutional principle.20  
In this set of cases, Justice Kennedy strongly favors national 
authority and tends to describe decentralized decision making not as 
an expression of a healthy system of federalism, but as unjustified, 
even wholly irrational or vicious. On occasion he has gone so far as to 
depict localized decision making as a dire threat to the rule of law and 
the Constitutional system. 
It is important to recognize that these characterizations of Justice 
Kennedy’s disapproval and fear of decentralized authority are not 
unlikely inferences constructed from free-wheeling interpretations of 
his positions. They are based on his own words. In the legal academy 
there is, I think, an unwillingness to appreciate the full import of 
these words. This could be, of course, because Kennedy’s sentiments 
are widely shared and therefore seem unremarkable. It could also be 
because the exaggeration and invective that are found in much of our 
constitutional discourse have inured the Justice’s audience. At any 
rate, it is instructive to offer some examples of the kind of language 
that Justice Kennedy employs when the authority of the national 
government is challenged in a serious way. 
In Romer v. Evans,21 Justice Kennedy authored an opinion that 
invalidated a state initiative (“Amendment 2”) that prohibited 
“any . . . claim of discrimination” based on homosexual status.22 The 
public arguments made by the proponents of Amendment 2 indicated 
that its main purpose was to prevent the gradual establishment of 
specially protected legal status for homosexuals.23 Now, it certainly 
can be doubted that it would be wise to prevent homosexuality from 
becoming a suspect class, and, in any event, it can be doubted that a 
 
18. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 562 (2003). 
19. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
20. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
21. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
22. Id. at 623–25. 
23. Stephen Bransford, Gay Politics vs. Colorado and America: The Inside 
Story of Amendment 2, at 7 (1994).  
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state constitutional amendment like Amendment 2 would be a 
practical means to achieve that goal. But it cannot be doubted that 
the Supreme Court’s equal protection cases have (rather 
paradoxically) established different degrees of protection from 
discrimination for different groups. Nor can it be doubted that various 
governmental institutions, including the Court, could establish (and, 
in some instances, have established) a special level of legal protection 
for homosexuals.  
The Romer opinion averts to none of these considerations. From 
the breadth of Amendment 2’s language, Justice Kennedy concludes 
that the initiative seemed “inexplicable by anything but animus.”24 
Indeed, he asserts as an “inevitable inference”25 that the law was 
“born of animosity,”26 a “bare . . . desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group.”27 Thus Justice Kennedy could not understand what 
he described as a challenge to “our constitutional tradition” as 
anything other than an irrational act of hatred.28 
When state-based policies collide with what the Court conceives 
to be our national legal norms and traditions, to Kennedy the 
consequences can seem not only morally ugly, but dangerous to 
nationhood itself. In a case challenging a state law that limited the 
terms of congressional representatives elected from that state, Justice 
Kennedy concurred in an opinion invalidating the law.29 Kennedy 
argued that term limits implicated the idea that “the sole political 
identity of an American is with the State of his or her residence.”30 
Thus, he depicted state-based term limits as threatening the very idea 
of nationhood by denying that citizens and their representatives in 
Congress need have any sense of loyalty or responsibility to the nation 
as a whole.  
In modern times, with the enormous size and importance of the 
federal government firmly established, this claim is so unrealistic as to 
be baffling. What could have driven the thoughtful and careful 
Justice Kennedy to such an unlikely fear? The answer, perhaps, can 
be found in the majority’s opinion, which argues that national 
representatives “owe their allegiance to the people [of the whole 
nation], and not to the States.”31 Indeed, this idea is repeated in the  
24. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1995).  
25. Id. at 634. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 633. 
29. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  
30. Id. at 840. 
31. Id. at 804 (majority opinion). 
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opinion’s final paragraph: “Members of Congress . . . become, when 
elected, servants of the people of the United States.”32 Apparently 
members of the politically-insulated Supreme Court, including Justice 
Kennedy, see political ties to localities as so parochial and divisive 
that the very idea of divided loyalties must be denied. 
The authority of the national government is even more starkly 
challenged when a state institution does not comply with an 
injunction designed to correct a condition found by a lower federal 
court to violate a constitutional standard defined by the Supreme 
Court. In such instances, the noncompliance, whether caused by 
outright defiance or by differing priorities, is not merely a conflict 
between a locality’s judgment about what is constitutionally 
permissible and the Court’s subsequent determination. It is a conflict 
between, on the one hand, a judicial determination that a particular 
condition violates an existing constitutional requirement and, on the 
other, a locality’s continuing recalcitrance.  
In the litigation that culminated in Brown v. Plata,33 a lower 
federal court had found that over-crowding in California’s prison 
system violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 
by resulting in grossly inadequate levels of medical care.34 The court 
ordered a series of reforms, including ambitious construction and 
hiring programs. These changes were not fully implemented because 
of budgetary shortfalls and a variety of administrative failures.35 
Eventually (after five years in one case and twelve in another), the 
lower court ordered the state to release 46,000 prisoners system-
wide.36 This decree was challenged as being in violation of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act,37 which limits the authority of federal judges 
to take control of state institutions.38 Among the state’s claims was 
the argument that the scope of the remedy exceeded the scope of the 
constitutional violation since the release of prisoners was not limited 
to those who had suffered inadequate medical attention. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy upheld the decree. He 
described the underlying prison conditions as threatening the “essence 
of human dignity”39 and explained the state’s noncompliance in part 
 
32. Id. at 837–38. 
33. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
34. Id. at 1922. 
35. Id. at 1926–27. 
36. Id. at 1923. 
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2012). 
38. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1922–23. 
39. Id. at 1928. 
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on “lack of political will.”40 He asserted that the injunction could 
apply to healthy prisoners because all prisoners were at risk of 
receiving inadequate medical care if at some point they developed a 
need for such care.41 Appealing for the need for flexibility in designing 
structural injunctions, Kennedy denied that judicial control over 
difficult executive and legislative decisions, including predictions 
about the degree of danger posed to the public by various prisoner 
release plans, exceeded the judicial role.42 
Justice Scalia’s dissent claims that the Court’s decision affirmed 
“what is perhaps the most radical injunction issued by a court in our 
Nation’s history.”43 Whether this is accurate or not, there can be no 
doubt that Justice Kennedy’s opinion revived the wide-open 
conception of the judicial role from the era of the institutional reform 
decrees in the 1970s and 1980s when lower federal courts had 
attempted to run local school districts, prisons, mental hospitals, and 
public housing programs. This revival is startling in light of the 
efforts by both the Court and Congress to place limits on the power 
of federal courts to operate public institutions. 
Kennedy’s opinion in Brown demonstrates that when state 
recalcitrance causes a direct conflict between state power and explicit 
expressions of national authority, Justice Kennedy graphically 
displays certain familiar tendencies. First, there is a laxity in the legal 
concepts employed. The constitutional right is defined in lofty terms 
(“the essence of human dignity”),44 and the specific violation is 
conceived of expansively (encompassing an entire prison system, 
including inmates who have not been mistreated). Second, state level 
recalcitrance is not viewed as an instance of sobering disagreement 
that should naturally lead to second thoughts about the exercise of 
national power. Rather the disagreements are depicted simply as 
failures (“lack of political will”).45 Third, the consequence of the clash 
between national authority and state authority is an expanded role 
for the federal judiciary. 
Although national authority is certainly challenged when states 
resist injunctions, as in Brown, the challenge to the Supreme Court 
itself is somewhat indirect since it is always possible that the lower 
court’s decree might have exceeded what is necessary to protect the 
constitutional principle previously announced by the Court. However, 
 
40. Id. at 1936. 
41. Id. at 1940. 
42. Id. at 1944. 
43. Id. at 1950. 
44. Id. at 1928. 
45. Id. at 1936. 
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in the circumstances of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,46 even this 
slight degree of attenuation is missing. Casey, of course, upheld the 
fundamental holding of Roe v. Wade47 that had established a 
fundamental constitutional right to abortion.48 In this sense the state 
legislation at issue in Casey was the culmination of numerous state 
efforts over decades to get the Supreme Court to reconsider its 
decision in Roe. 
Justice Kennedy co-authored the famous plurality opinion. To say 
the least, this opinion richly displays the intellectual impulses already 
identified. Its defense and conceptualization of the legal basis of the 
underlying right is loose indeed. In fact, the plurality acknowledges 
that there is “weight” to the arguments for overruling Roe.49 It 
declines to do so, however, partly on the ground that the liberties 
protected by the Due Process Clause extend to: “choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy . . . . At the heart of liberty is the 
right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”50 And the scope of this 
right is as uncertain as its derivation, for state restrictions on abortion 
violate this right if they create an “undue burden.”51 
The plurality perceives state-based resistance to Roe as 
representing an intense struggle with national authority, almost 
combat. The Roe plurality Justices declare that they cannot create 
the impression that they will “surrender” to political pressure.52 To 
those who have accepted the ruling in Roe, “the Court . . . undertakes 
to remain steadfast.”53 To overrule that decision, to give in to political 
“fire,”54 would amount to “a breach of faith.”55  
As described by the plurality, this struggle implicates a judicial 
role that is staggering in its reach and significance. The plurality 
calmly reports that the myriad of disputed and profound questions—
whether philosophical, religious, medical, and psychological—that 
were implicated by Roe all “fall within judicial competence.”56 
Moreover, the plurality displays no self-doubt in reporting that Roe  
46. 505 U.S. 833 (1922). 
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).   
48. Casey, 505 U.S. at 845–46. 
49. Id. at 853. 
50. Id. at 851. 
51. Id. at 874. 
52. Id. at 867. 
53. Id. at 868. 
54. Id. at 867. 
55. Id. at 868. 
56. Id. at 855. 
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resulted in fundamental social transformation. It changed the way 
“people have organized intimate relationships and made choices that 
define their views of themselves and their places in society.”57 Perhaps 
more astonishingly, one purpose of Roe was to “call[] the contending 
sides of a national controversy to end their national division by 
accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”58 To give 
in to those who disagree with the Court would exact a  
“terrible price.”59 
Like the character of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court 
must be earned over time. So, indeed, must be the character of 
a nation of people who aspire to live according to the rule of 
law. Their belief in themselves as such a people is not readily 
separable from their understanding of the Court invested with 
the authority to . . . speak before all others for their 
constitutional ideals.60  
Both the rule of law and nationhood itself are, apparently, fragile. 
The Court’s role in authoritatively resolving certain crucial 
constitutional cases is thought to be essential to both. 
Conclusion 
In a case challenging the constitutionality of traditional state 
marriage laws, the outcome would turn on the degree of deference 
that Justice Kennedy gives to state judgments about sensitive issues 
of morality, psychology, and sociology. To the extent that the state’s 
judgments on these matters differed from Justice Kennedy’s own, 
especially to the extent that his own judgments were already 
expressed in prior constitutional decisions, his record indicates that he 
would see the state’s judgments as illegitimate and even dangerous. 
This suggests that in Windsor, Kennedy respected, and even extolled, 
the state policy judgments favoring same-sex marriage, not so much 
because of principles of federalism, but because the New York law 
presented little challenge to centralized authority and, indeed, 
reinforced controversial opinions expressed by the Supreme Court in 
cases like Romer and Lawrence. 
Recall the tentative, inconclusive nature of Justice Kennedy’s 
reliance on federalism in Windsor (as well the loose use of other legal 
materials). It may seem odd for an opinion to combine rather 
ambiguous and unsupported references to doctrines and precedent 
 
57. Id. at 856. 
58. Id. at 867. 
59. Id. at 864. 
60. Id. at 868. 
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with the kind of inflated view of the country’s need for judicial 
supremacy that I have been describing. Indeed, by one view, the 
modern fixation on judicial supremacy can be explained by the revival 
of legal “fundamentalism,” which sees constitutional questions as 
narrowly legalistic and therefore entirely within the realm of judicial 
expertise.61 Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor suggests that just 
the opposite may be true. 
Beginning with Justice Kennedy’s confirmation hearings62 and 
running through cases like Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor, Justice 
Kennedy has demonstrated an inclination to see legal authority in at 
least some kinds of constitutional cases as necessarily soft or 
indeterminate. It is plausible that a justice holding this view—
especially if it is combined with a belief that this kind of legal 
authority must be applied to controversial matters that can in no way  
be regarded as within the special competence of judges—is also 
inclined to believe that the underpinnings of the central government’s 
authority are fragile. For such a justice, the Court must displace 
political authority on the basis of wavering, indistinct legal 
explanations and without any special expertise at resolving the 
underlying cultural issues in question. It may be, then, that Justice 
Kennedy’s version of legal realism undermines his capacity to feel 
confidence in the justifications put forward in controversial cases. The 
more insecure national authority—as represented by the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional pronouncements—seems, the more dangerous 
robust assertions of state power seem. As a distinctive sense of law 
recedes, judicial supremacy emerges. 
 
61. Larry Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 5, 169 
(2001). 
62. In the course of his confirmation hearings, then Judge Kennedy wrote:  
 The framers chose their words with great care. Those words have an 
objective meaning that we should ascertain from the perspective of 
history and our constitutional experience. The words of the 
Constitution, their objective meaning, and the official consequence of 
their enactment as a constitutional rule, are the principal guides to 
constitutional interpretation. This said, please permit me to underscore 
my earlier statements that I do not have a unitary or grand design of 
constitutional interpretation. 
The Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States Before the Committee on the 
Judiciary United States Senate, 100th Cong. 743 (1987). At his 
confirmation hearing, Judge Kennedy replied to a question on textual 
interpretation in a similar fashion: “Remember, though, Senator, that 
the object of our inquiry is to use history, the case law, and our 
understanding of the American constitutional tradition in order to 
determine the intention of the document broadly expressed.” Id. at 86 
(statement of Judge Anthony M. Kennedy). 
